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Abstract
This paper is motivated by three observations about the link between international
trade and international business cycle synchronization: (1) a large increase in trade in
manufactures over the last 30 years, (2) a larger fraction of trade between core and
periphery regions relative to core regions is in the form of production sharing, (3) cross-
country output correlations have increased between core and periphery regions relative
to core regions. We examine to what extent these observations can be reconciled in a
multi-country version of a standard model of international business cycles. Production
sharing is captured in a simple way as trade in intermediate inputs that are comple-
ments in production. We ﬁnd that the model is successful qualitatively in account for
these observations. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd that the direct eﬀects from trade do not
generate large divergence in output correlatio n sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .W ee x t e n dt h em o d e l
to allow for cost reduction spillovers from MNEs in the core country to their aﬃliates
in the periphery. This mechanism increases the impact that product sharing has on
output correlations between core and peripheral countries.
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Over the last thirty years trade in manufactures relative to output in manufactures has
more than doubled. The nature of this trade diﬀers, however, across country pairs. We ﬁnd
it useful to distinguish between trade that occurs between core regions, such as the U.S.
and Europe, and trade between core regions and their periphery (the US with its NAFTA
trading partners, for example). Trade between core and periphery countries involves more
production sharing - the division of production processes into separate parts that can be
done in diﬀerent locations - than does trade between core regions. A natural question is how
the increase in trade has aﬀected international business cycle synchronization.1
Figures 1 and 2 show ten-year rolling correlations of GDP, investment and consumption
between the U.S. and two of its major trading partners, an EU aggregate and Canada.
Figure 1 suggests that, at least as measured by this simple metric, business cycles in the
EU have become less linked to the U.S. cycle over time.2 Figure 2 shows the bilateral
relationship with Canada, which appears to be quite diﬀerent. In this case, correlations with
the U.S. have been high since the 1970s with no clear decline in the 1990s.3 Table 1 shows
that Mexico’s business cycles have also become signiﬁcantly more correlated with the U.S.
since the 1980s. The one-size-ﬁts-all connection between trade and business cycles does not
seem to be supported by the data. Our conjecture is that the higher cross-country output
correlations between core and periphery regions is partly a consequence of the increase in
production sharing.
We study the link between business cycle synchronization and trade ﬂows between dif-
ferent regions using an extended version of the standard model of international business
cycles proposed by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995), henceforth BKK. We assume that
trade between the “core” economic regions of the U.S. and Europe takes the form of trade
in intermediate goods of diﬀerent varieties. Firms in each region specialize in the produc-
1Papers that study this question include, among many others, Canova and Dellas (1993), Kelemli-Ozcan,
Sorensen and Yosha (2002), Baxter and Michael Kouparitsas (2002), and Kose and Yi (2001, 2002).
2A large empirical literature has developed around the issue of business cycle synchronization. Among
the many papers that examine this question are Bordo and Helbling (2003), Doyle and Faust (2002), Imbs
(1999, 2003), Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003a, 2003b), Kose and Yi (2002), Heatchote and Perri (2002,
2003), and Stock and Watson (2003).
3Doyle and Faust (2002) test explicitly for breaks in the correlation of output growth for G7 countries
corresponding to the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. They ﬁnd no statistical evidence supporting an increase
in correlation coeﬃcients corresponding to those splits by decade, even for the US and Canada where trade
integration has increased substantially.
2tion of a particular variety, and consumers and ﬁr m sh a v ed e m a n d so v e rar a n g eo fv a r i e t i e s
produced in both locations. An aggregate shock that lowers the relative marginal cost of
production in one country, will induce ﬁrms and households in both countries to substitute
toward the lower price variety. This results in a negative transmission of the business cy-
cle. In contrast, trade between core regions and “periphery” countries involves production
chains that are linked across national borders. In this case, there is trade in intermediate
goods but imported inputs are now complementary to domestic factors of production. So,
an aggregate shock that lowers the cost of production in the core country will increase the
demand of this country for intermediate products produced in the periphery countries that
are required to produce the ﬁnal good. This results in a positive transmission of the business
cycle. We develop a multi-country model that has the potential of simultaneously producing
a relatively higher output comovement between some country pairs, and a relatively lower
comovement between other country pairs.
We take a calibrated version of our model and consider a change in parameters that
r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nt r a d es h a r e sa saf r a c t i o no fG D P .W et h e ne x a m i n et h ec h a n g ei n
cross-country correlations of business cycles that result from this expermient. Our bench-
mark model is successful in producing an increase in output correlations between core and
periphery countries, relative to output correlations between core countries. However, it falls
short of explaining the magnitude of the divergence observed in the data. This is mainly
for two reasons. First, the share of value added generated by exports is small both for the
core and the periphery countries. This is true even when exports account for a very large
fraction of manufacturing GDP in periphery regions - in those regions, exports are large, but
so is the use of imported intermediate inputs. This limits the eﬀects that trade can have
on business cycle cross-correlations. Second, we (realistically) assume that periphery coun-
tries have both a production-sharing sector as well as a non-production-sharing sector. The
business cycle eﬀects stemming from the non-production-sharing sector (where substitution
between domestic and foreign inputs is relatively higher) oﬀset the eﬀects coming from com-
plementarity in the production-sharing sector. We also consider an extension of the model
where production sharing involves not only inputs that are complements in production, but
in addition we assume that technological innovations or cost reductions that occur in the
home multinational enterprises (MNE) in the core country are shared with its aﬃliate in the
periphery country. Not surprisingly, this leads to a signiﬁcant increase in output correlations
3between the core and periphery, relative to output correlations between the two core regions.
Previous studies have examined the impact of diﬀering degrees of substitutability in
traded intermediate inputs on business cycles (see in particular, Ambler, Cardia and Zim-
merman (1998), and Heathcote and Perri (2003)). Kose and Yi (2001, 2002) use this type
of structure to study the impact of a decline in trading costs on the volume of trade and the
transmission of cycles. Our paper diﬀers from these studies in that our goal is to simultane-
ously produce an increase in output comovements between some country pairs (low elasticity
of substitution associated with product sharing), and a decrease in output comovements be-
tween other country pairs (higher elasticity of substitution between traded goods). As we will
show, the results in a two-country setting are quite diﬀerent from the multi-country setting
because of oﬀsetting eﬀects that result in the full model of trade. Moreover, consistent with
their ﬁndings, our results indicate that a small share of value added contributed by exports
to the local economy in both countries (and not just exports themselves, which include a
large fraction of imported inputs) limits the degree to which the production sharing sector
(both in the core and in the periphery) can impact local economic conditions.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We ﬁrst review the observations on international
business cycles and trade that we focus on in this paper. We then present our four-country
model, and describe how we calibrate it. We then examine the model’s implications for the
link between trade and international business cycles. We ﬁnally discuss two extensions of
the model.
2. Trade and business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Observation 1: International correlations diﬀer across trading partners. Core
regions tend to have low correlations, while correlations between core and pe-
riphery regions are high.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the correlations of detrended GDP between the United States
and its trading partners diﬀer across regions and in some cases change over time. To amplify
this point, Table 1 provides cross-country correlations for output, consumption and invest-
ment over the 1970:1 — 2004:2 period.4 All data are at a quarterly frequency, seasonally
4Bilateral correlations are just one way of measuring the comovement of business cycles across countries.
Other methods include the decomposition of time series variation into global, regional and country-speciﬁc
factors (see the studies by Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003a)), dynamic factor analysis (Gregory, Head
and Raynauld (1997)), VARs (Clark and Shin (2000)), and identiﬁcation of common business cycle turning
4adjusted and detrended using the HP ﬁlter. The top three panels of Table 1 report decade
averages of the correlations between the U.S. and its major trading partners for GDP, con-
sumption and investment. The bottom three panels repeat these decadal correlations for
Europe5 and its major trading partners.
Turning ﬁrst to the output correlations (panels 1a and 2a of Table 1) the data suggest that
business cycles in the core regions of U.S., Europe and Japan have become less synchronous
from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the case of the U.S. and Europe, the correlation of GDP
drops from 0.74 in the 1970s, to 0.53 in the 1980s to 0.06 in the 1990s.6 There is a dramatic
upturn in the 2000:1-2004:2 period reﬂecting the common recession in both regions. Whether
the recent recession marks a change in the correlation structure across countries, or is simply
ar e ﬂection of a global shock that aﬀected all countries in 2001 is an open question. The
U.S. and Japan have also become less correlated over time, with a negative correlation of
-0.25 in the 1990s, though this is again followed by a signiﬁcant increase in the correlation
i nt h el a s tf o u ry e a r s .T h e r ei sa l s oad o w n w a r d trend in the correlations of output between
Europe and Japan, although the magnitude of the change is small.
The last three columns in part 1 of Table 1 show the correlations between the U.S.
and its NAFTA trading partners. There is no evidence of a signiﬁcant decline in business
cycle correlations between the U.S. and Canada over the 1970-2004 period. The fourth
column shows the correlation with Mexico based on quarterly data, and the last column the
correlation based on annual data. In the case of Mexico, quarterly time series is available
only from 1980:1. The data suggest that Mexico has become more correlated with the U.S.
since the 1980s.
The time series data from Eastern Europe start in 1996. The last column in panel 2
shows the correlation between GDP for the European aggregate and an aggregate of Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The correlation is in the range of 0.41 to 0.43.
Turning to the international correlations for consumption and investment, we see the
typical patterns found in international data. On a bilateral basis consumption is almost
always less correlated than output. In general, bilateral output, investment and consumption
points (Harding and Pagan (2002)).
5The European aggregate includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
6Caution should be exercised in interpreting point estimates of correlations without taking standard errors
into account. See Doyle and Faust (2002) for an econometric methodology for estimating breaks in second
moments of time series.
5correlations tend to rise and fall together.
Observation 2: Most trade ﬂows are either between core regions or between
core regions and their corresponding periphery. There is little cross-periphery
trade.
Our model of trade will assume that there are two core regions, namely the U.S. and
Europe. Each core region trades with a periphery region — the U.S. with Canada and
Mexico, and Europe with Eastern Europe. Table 2 reports the decomposition of trade ﬂows
between the U.S., Europe, North America and Eastern Europe. Europe accounts for roughly
20 percent of U.S. exports and imports. Trade with its NAFTA partners accounts for 30
percent of U.S. imports and 37 percent of U.S. exports. Our model will abstract from trade
with Asia, which accounts for the remainder of U.S. trade.
Part B of Table 2 shows a similar decomposition for Europe. Trade with the U.S. accounts
for roughly 20 percent of European imports and 24 percent of European exports. About 10
percent of European trade is now with Eastern Europe. Note that there is very little trade
between Europe and Canada and Mexico. In the model developed in Section 3 we will make
the extreme assumption that there is no trade between Europe and the periphery countries
in North America. Panels C, D and E show trade patterns for Canada, Mexico and Eastern
Europe. The data support the view that the bulk of trade for these countries is regional
trade, either within North America or within Europe.
Observation 3: Trade as a share of manufacturing has risen, but the impor-
tance of trade in total GDP remains small.
Table 3 shows the importance of trade in production. Panel A reports the share of trade
measured as exports plus imports over aggregate GDP in the U.S., Europe, Japan, Canada
and Mexico. Note that European trade is the external trade of the European aggregate with
countries outside of western Europe. The U.S. trade share has increased from roughly 12
percent of GDP in the 1970s to about 18 percent at the end of our sample. The share of
trade in GDP has declined slightly in Japan. External European trade has risen to account
for nearly 40 percent of GDP. However, the most dramatic increase in trade is in Canada,
growing from about 40 percent of GDP to nearly three-quarters of GDP. In Mexico the trade
share now exceeds 50 percent.
While trade in total GDP has risen modestly in most regions, there has been a much
more dramatic increase in trade in manufactures. Panel B reports trade in manufactures
6as a share of GDP of the manufacturing sector. In the U.S., Europe, and Japan, this ratio
exceeds 1, and in Canada and Mexico the ratio is over 2.5. This provides a glimpse of the
importance of production sharing within the NAFTA zone, where intermediate inputs are
shipped across international borders and value is added at intermediate stages of production.
As transportation costs and other trading barriers are reduced, goods may cross international
boundaries several times along the production chain, resulting in a measure of trade that
is larger than the value of local production (for a more detailed description, see Yi (2000)).
This is consistent with the high trade shares in manufacturing observed for Canada and
Mexico and will be a key feature of our model of trade between core and periphery regions.
The third panel of Table 3 shows that the share of manufacturing in total GDP is roughly
15 to 20 percent. This ratio has either declined or stayed constant in most countries. The
fact that manufacturing is a small share of GDP, and that value added generated by exports
is not a large share of total GDP, poses a challenge to models that attempt to link trade
and business cycles. The increase in trade alone is insuﬃcient to deliver signiﬁcant changes
in business cycles correlations in standard models of trade, a ﬁnding that is underscored in
Kose and Yi (2002). We will show below that production sharing helps to amplify the role
of trade in the business cycle, but its overall impact depends on the strength of the ties
between the production sharing sector and the local economy.
Observation 4: Production sharing tends to occur between core and periphery
regions.
A central feature of our argument is that the type of trade that occurs between countries
will aﬀect the way that business cycles are transmitted. Trade between core countries, we
argue, is largely trade in varieties of goods that can be readily substituted for each other.
T r a d eb e t w e e nt h ec o r ea n dp e r i p h e r y ,h o w e v e r ,r e ﬂects the slicing up of the production
chain, where inputs are shipped across borders to capitalize on location-speciﬁca d v a n t a g e s
and each stage of production depends on the particular inputs from the previous stage.7
According to Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2003), vertical specialization (the production of goods
in multiple stages of production in multiple countries) accounted for one-third of export
growth between 1970 and 1990.8
7Many terms are used to describe this phenomenon: vertical specialization, fragmentation of production,
production sharing, rationalization of production, vertical production networks, outward processing and
outsourcing, and there are likely more. We will follow the US International Trade Commission and use the
term production sharing to mean the manufacture of a good that takes place in more than one country.
8A number of factors are credited for the expansion of production sharing: reduction in trading barriers
7Re-importation of domestic content
Anecdotal evidence of production sharing and vertical integration are plentiful. Two
often-cited examples are the production of Barbie dolls and automobiles. An article in the
Los Angeles Times documented the global travels of Barbie, who required plastic and hair
from Taiwan and Japan, assembly in Indonesia, Malaysia and China, dress cloth from China,
and multiple trips through Hong Kong (Tempest (1996) and Feenstra (1998)). Another
well-known example is the temporary shut down of automobile assembly plants in Detroit
following the border closures on 9/11 due to the delay of delivery of automobile parts and
inventory from Canada (Council on Foreign Relations Report, 2002).
Concrete evidence on the magnitude of this phenomenon is harder to come by.9 One
measure of the extent of production sharing by U.S. corporations is captured by the fraction
of U.S. content in U.S. imports, shown in Figure 3. Under Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule 9802,
companies are granted an exemption from U.S. customs duties and user fees for the value
of U.S.-made components that are contained in goods that are assembled overseas and re-
imported into the U.S.10 While this data would appear to be the ideal source for information
about the extent of U.S. production sharing, there is an important problem. Companies
have an incentive to report U.S. content in imported goods only when faced with signiﬁcant
tariﬀ barriers. After the signing of the Canda-U.S. free trade agreement in 1991 and the
creation of NAFTA in 1994, ﬁrms in Canada and Mexico no longer had as great an incentive
to apply for exemption under 9802. This is reﬂected in the dramatic decline in Canadian
imports coming in under 9802 between 1990 and 1991, to just a trickle thereafter (see Figure
3). Similarly for Mexico, the share of imports coming in under 9802 begins to decline in
1995, though it remains fairly high even in the years after the formation of NAFTA.11
The low numbers for U.S. content in imports from Europe also contain some information.
While tariﬀ barriers remain for ﬁrms engaged in production sharing in Europe, note that
virtually none of the manufacturing imports from Europe contain U.S. content, suggesting
that little production sharing is taking place by U.S. ﬁrms operating in Europe. The second
conclusion is that a conservative estimate of the U.S. content of goods imported from Mexico
and physical trading costs, improvement in information technology, and other technological advances that
make it possible to split production processes.
9See, for example, Yeats (1999).
10See “Production Sharing: Use of U.S. Components and Materials in Foreign Assembly Operations”
various issues for detailed discussion of the data on US production sharing and trade.
11Companies still enjoyed some beneﬁts under 9802 even after NAFTA was enacted. For details, see
various issues of the USITC reports on production sharing.
8under the production sharing provision ranges from 30 to 35 percent of US manufacturing
imports. Studies by the OECD and the European Union suggest that a similar process of
production sharing is taking place between countries in Western Europe and Central Europe.
(see Topolansky 1998).
Trade between U.S. multinationals and their foreign aﬃliates
Trade between U.S. multinationals and their aﬃliates provide an alternative source of
information about the extent of production sharing.12 This obviously abstracts from produc-
tion sharing through arms-length transactions. Panel A of table 4 shows the ratio of sales
of U.S. aﬃliates in Canada, Mexico, Europe and Japan to total aﬃliate sales. A signiﬁcant
fraction (35 to 45 percent) of the sales of aﬃliates in the NAFTA region are sales back to
the United States, suggesting that aﬃliates are part of a vertically- integrated production
chain and the goods are ultimately shipped back to the U.S. In contrast, only a small frac-
tion of the sales of European and Japanese aﬃliates are sales to the U.S. (3 and 6 percent,
respectively), evidence that the activity of those aﬃl i a t e si sq u i t ed i ﬀerent.13
Panel B shows the ratio of exports of U.S. parents to their aﬃliates as a fraction of the
total sales of aﬃliates. This measure provides an estimate of the importance in production
of imported intermediate inputs from the parent company. Again, there is an apparent
diﬀerence between the activities of aﬃliates in Canada and Mexico relative to Europe and
Japan. Exports to aﬃliates account for roughly 40 percent of the sales volume of aﬃliates in
the NAFTA region, but only 5 to 10 percent of the sales volume in Europe and Asia. This
suggests that much more of the production by European and Asian aﬃl i a t e si sd o n ew h e r e
the aﬃliate is located, and there is less dependence on intermediate inputs from the parent
in the United States.
Finally, Panel C provides an index of the importance of production sharing in terms of
local value added in manufacturing. This will be a critical parameter in the calibration of
our model, because it measures the extent to which production sharing matters for the local
economy. The value of exports includes a large fraction of imported intermediate inputs14,
but what is important to determine the extent of synchronization of business cycles is the
local value added generated by exports. The numerator of the index is sales of aﬃliates to the
12See, for example, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2004), and Chen and Yi (2003).
13This fact is also document by Ekholm et.al (2003). They designate aﬃliate sales to the home or third
c o u n t r i e sa s“ e x p o r t - p l a t f o r mF D I ”a so p p o s ed to FDI motivated by vertical integration.
14See Yi (2003).
9U.S. less U.S. exports to aﬃliates scaled by the share of U.S. sales in total sales. The scaling
adjusts for the fact that not all exports to aﬃliates return to the U.S., and the diﬀerence
picks up the net transfer of resources from the aﬃliate back to the parent. The data in
Panel C suggest that production sharing is a trivial fraction of manufacturing value added in
Europe and Japan, while it accounts for some 35 to 42 percent of manufacturing value added
in Mexico and Canada. The data also suggest that the importance of production sharing in
local value added has increased over time in Mexico and Canada.
Mexican Maquiladoras
Data on the manufacturing and trade of the maquiladora plants in Mexico provides direct
evidence on the extent of production sharing with Mexico. The Maquiladora Program was
established in 1964 to help relieve high unemployment in the northern region of Mexico.
Firms were granted the right to set up production in the region and to import materials and
equipment duty-free under the proviso that, after assembling the inputs into ﬁnal goods,
the goods would be re-exported. They are most active in the electronics, auto parts, and
apparel industries. Many maquiladoras are not foreign-owned, and deal with MNE’s through
arms-length transactions. As shown in Figure 415, maquiladora exports account for about
50 percent of all non-oil exports from Mexico.16 The ﬁgure also shows the ratio of imports
to the maquiladora sector as a fraction of exports from the maquiladora sector. The ratio
is roughly 0.75, suggesting that for every 75 cents of intermediate inputs exported from the
U.S. to Mexico, a dollar is sent back, or that 25 cents of Mexican value is added to the
product. This ratio will also play a key feature in our model, as it reﬂects the extent to
which local factors of production are drawn into the production sharing process.
Finally, we can use the maquiladora data to obtain an alternative value of our production
sharing index. The sum of value added of maquiladoras plus domestic intermediate inputs,
as a fraction of manufacturing GDP in Mexico increased from 7% in 1990 to 17% in 2002.17
Note that this does not include operations by aﬃliates of U.S. multinationals in Mexico.
According to Hanson, Mataloni and Yorgason (2002), the share of value added by nonbank
15The source of information on maquiladoras is INEGI, Mexico’s oﬃcial statistical agency. The data on
gross output, intermediate inputs (domestic and imported), and value added can be found in this website:
http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVJ1500080010001000100020#ARBOL
16The distinction between oil and non-oil exports was important in the 1980s but now has very little
eﬀect on the ratio. In 2002, the ratio of maquilidora exports in total exports was 49 percent compared to
maquilidora exports in total exports excluding oil of 55 percent.
17The source of information on manufacturing GDP is Banco de Mexico.
10aﬃliates as a fraction of Mexican manufacturing gross domestic product increased from 12%
in 1989 to 19% in 1999.
The presence of US corporations operating in Mexico through the Maquiladora program
has created a close correspondence between ﬂuctuations in industrial production in Mexico
and the US.18 Figure 5 shows growth rates over the previous year in monthly industrial
production in Mexico and the US. Splitting the sample at end-1995, the correlation between
industrial production in the two countries increases from 0.19 in the 1980-95 period to 0.83
in the 1996-04:9 period.
To summarize, the goal of our paper is to replicate four features of the data on interna-
tional business cycles and trade. First, there has been a tendency for cross country output
correlations between core regions to increase relative to cross-correlations between core and
periphery regions. Second, most trade ﬂows are either intra-core trade or trade between a
core and its corresponding periphery. There is very little trade between periphery regions.
Third, value added generated by exports has increased, but still constitutes a relatively
small share of total GDP. And fourth, trade between core and periphery regions involves
more production sharing than trade between core regions.
3. Benchmark model
Our model of international trade and business cycles includes four countries, two “core
countries” denoted 1 and 2, and two “periphery countries” denoted 3 and 4. To help ﬁx
ideas, it may help to think of countries 1 and 2 as the U.S. and Western Europe, country
3 as the United States’s NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, and country 4 as Eastern
Europe. Consistent with the bilateral trade data in Table 2, we assume that the core countries
engage in trade with each other, and each core country trades with its own periphery country
(1 with 3 and 2 with 4). There is no trade between the periphery regions, or between a core
country and the other periphery (i.e. the U.S. trades with Europe and its NAFTA partners
but not with Eastern Europe, and Europe trades with the U.S. and Eastern Europe but not
with Canada and Mexico).
We measure time in discrete periods and index each period by t =1 ,2,3,...∞.C o u n t r i e s
18Gordon Hanson provided the following characterization of business cycle ﬂuctuations in Mexico: ’The
business cycle in the maquila sector is a highly exaggerated version of the U.S. business cycle...Growth in
the maquila sector is a couple of times what it is in U.S. manufacturing.” New York Times, "A Boom Along
the Border"August 26, 2004.
11are indexed by i =1 ,2....,4. Each country i has a population of Li individuals. Countries 1
and 2 a r es y m m e t r i c ,a sw e l la sc o u n t r i e s3 and 4.Preferences of the representative agent in
country i are characterized by an expected utility function of the form:




tu(cit,1 − nit) ,
where ci and ni are per capita consumption and employment in country i,a n du(c,1 − n)=
1/(1 − σ)
£
cµ (1 − n)
1−µ¤1−σ
.
Each country specializes in the production of one intermediate good. Per capita output
of the intermediate good zi requires inputs of domestic labor ni and capital ki,a n di sa ﬀected
by country speciﬁc aggregate productivity Ai which changes stochastically over time. The
production function has constant returns to scale, and is given by:
zit = Ait (nit)
α (kit)
1−α .
The vector of aggregate productivity shocks At =( A1t,A 2t,A 3t,A 4t) follows the process
At+1 = PA t + εt+1 ,w h e r eεt is distributed log-normally and independently over time with
mean ¯ A =
¡ ¯ A1, ¯ A2, ¯ A3, ¯ A4
¢
and variance Σ.
We assume that all trade occurs at the level of intermediate goods. Local and imported
intermediate goods are combined in each country to create two types of goods, x and v.
The asymmetric impact of trade on business cycles is due to an assumption about the
technology used to create these two goods. We assume that good x i sn o tp r o d u c e di na
vertically integrated production chain, and that ﬁrms can readily substitute between local
and foreign inputs in response to changes in technology and relative prices. Speciﬁcally,






































The ﬁrst subscript denotes the location of production, and the second subscript the input’s
country of origin. (x12 is the intermediate input from country 2 used in country 1’s produc-
tion.) We assume that the elasticity of substitution, 1/(1 − ρ), between inputs in this sector
12is relatively high. The parameter 1 − θi reﬂects the importance of imported intermediate
goods in production of good xi.
The second good, v, is produced in a vertical production chain that involves a production
sharing arrangement between ﬁrms in a core country and its periphery. Production of good v1












The parameter 1 − λ measures the importance of imported intermediate goods provided by
the periphery regions. We can think of good v1 as the product of a multinational enterprise
(MNE) in conjunction with its foreign aﬃliate in the periphery region. We can also think of
v13 as the inputs provided by Maquiladoras, which are not necessarily under the control of a
ﬁrm in the U.S. To capture the ﬂavor of production sharing in a simpliﬁed way, we assume
that inputs into the production of good v are complements relative to the production of
the good x. So, the elasticity of substitution in the production sharing sector, 1/(1 − ζ),
is assumed to be small relative to 1/(1 − ρ). Our model is intended to characterize the
decision of ﬁrms at business cycle frequencies, where plant and equipment in the periphery
country is already established and the ﬁrm’s decision is the optimal combination of factor
inputs and the amount to produce given relative prices. We abstract from interesting longer
run issues such as the location of the vertical production chain and the possibility that ﬁrms
could move between periphery locations.19
Two alternative assumptions can be made about the international ﬂow of intermediate
goods to produce good v1. Under the ﬁrst assumption, v11 is initially shipped to country 3,
v13 is added to produce good v1, and then v1 is shipped back to country 1. Under the second
assumption, v13 is shipped from country 3 to country 1, and combined with v11 in country
1 to produce the good v1. Even though the gross volume of trade is larger under the ﬁrst
assumption, the trade balance is identical as are equilibrium allocations.











Each country produces a non-tradeable ﬁnal good yi, which can be either consumed or
invested. In countries 1 and 2,t h eﬁnal good yi is a composite of goods xi and v, combined
19Ruhl (2004) studies a model where the presence of ﬁxed costs associated with trade imply that the




1−ω i =1 ,2
We assume that periphery countries do not engage in outsourcing to other countries, so in
countries 3 and 4 the ﬁnal good yi only uses good xi:
yit = xit , i =3 ,4
The resource constraints for intermediate inputs in the core countries are:
L1z1t = L1x11,t + L2x21t + L3x31t + L1v11t
L2z2t = L2x22,t + L1x12t + L4x42t + L2v22t
Intermediate goods from the core are either used by home ﬁrms in the x and v and sectors,
exported to the other core country, or exported to the periphery. Intermediate goods in the
periphery regions are used either for local production or in the vertical production chain:
L3z3t = L3x33,t + L1v13t
L4z4t = L4x44t + L2v24t
The ﬁnal good resource constraint in each country is given by:
yit = cit + iit for i =1 ,...,4
where
iit = kit+1 − (1 − δ)kit
As our baseline model, we consider a competitive equilibrium for this economy with
complete contingent claims markets. Agents can use contingent claims markets to diversify
country-speciﬁcr i s ka c r o s ss t a t e so fn a t u r e s .W ew i l le x p l o i tt h ef a c tt h a tt h ee q u i l i b r i u m
allocations are Pareto optimal by solving the following planner’s optimal problem:
max L1U1 + L2U2 + L3U3 + L4U4 ,
subject to the technology and resource constraints described above. By choosing a suitable
set of initial wealth levels, the competitive equilibrium allocations are identical to the ones
that are obtained by solving this planner’s problem. Furthermore, prices can be computed
from marginal rates of substitution across goods. The numeraire is the price of the good
14produced by country 1 (i.e. Pz
1t =1 ). We will also consider a version of the model with
incomplete contingent claims markets. In particular, we go to the opposite extreme of ruling
out contingent claims markets, so that there is no intertemporal trade. Under this scenario
of ﬁnancial autarky (see Heathcote and Perri 2002), the trade balance of each country has
to be 0 in every state of nature.
Using the resource constraints, gross domestic product in country 1 (in terms of inter-
mediate good z1)i se q u a lt oL1z1t and the following national accounts identity holds:
L1z1t = P
y
1tL1(c1t + i1t)+TB 1t ,
where P
y
1t denotes the price of the ﬁnal good in country 1, and the trade balance TB1 is:










3t(c3t + i3t)+TB 3t ,
where the trade balance TB 3 is:
TB 3t = L1P
z
3tv13t − L3x31t .
We will also consider two extensions to the basic model.
Extension 1: Intermediate inputs in intermediate good production
We assume that production of the intermediate good in each country also requires inter-
mediate inputs from the local economy. In the U.S., for example, the share of value added in
gross output for the total economy is close to 50%. As we will see below, adding intermediate
inputs has the potential eﬀect of increasing the eﬀects of trade on cyclical ﬂuctuations in the
periphery countries, as more domestic inputs are required to produce the exportable good.
We model the production function in each country in the following way:
zit = Ait (nit)
αγ (kit)
(1−α)γ (mit)
1−γ ,f o ri =1 ,...,4 ,
where mit denotes the quantity of intermediate inputs used in production of good i,a n dγ
denotes the share of value added in gross output. We assume that intermediate inputs are
in units of the ﬁnal good, so the resource constraint for the ﬁnal good is given by:
yit = cit + iit + mit , for i =1 ,...,4
15Extension 2: Spillover of productivity through production sharing
I nt h eb a s i cm o d e lw ea s s u m et h a tp r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k sa r eu n c o r r e l a t e da n dt h a tt h e r e
is no spillover of technology through trade. An alternative view is that production sharing
involves not only inputs that are complements in production, but that technological innova-
tions that occur in the home MNE would be shared with its aﬃliate. For example, we now
assume that a labor-saving innovation that is discovered by the managers of a MNE would
also be implemented in that ﬁrm’s foreign aﬃliates.20
To capture this transmission of technology to aﬃliates, we assume that the aggregate
productivity in country 1 is diﬀused to those ﬁrms in country 3 involved in the production
of inputs to v1.S o , ﬁrms in country 3 producing the good that is exported to country 1
(f-ﬁrms) have a diﬀerent productivity that ﬁrms in country 3 producing the intermediate
good that is used to produce the domestic ﬁnal good (l-ﬁrms). Under this assumption, the


























The parameter η measures the extent of productivity diﬀusion from country 1 to country 3.
The variable d3 is also the relative price of x33 in terms of v13.W h e nη =0 ,w ea r eb a c kt o
the benchmark model.
It is straightforward to show this model can be mapped to the one-production-sector
model as the benchmark economy, where the resource constraint in country 3 is now given
by:




In this modiﬁed model, gross domestic product in country 3 at constant prices (i.e.: real












20Desai and Foley (2004) ﬁnd evidence that the investment decisions of MNEs and their aﬃliates are highly
correlated. Ex post returns of MNEs and their publicly listed aﬃliates are also highly correlated. Both facts
are consistent with common productivity shocks to the parent and the aﬃliate.
164. Choice of parameters
We follow BKK in choosing the values of β, µ , σ , δ ,a n dα. The period length is one
quarter. We choose β =0 .99 so that the quarterly real interest is 1%, σ =2so that the
risk aversion coeﬃcient is 0.5, α =1 /3, and δ =0 .025. We set the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign intermediate inputs in the production of good x,[ 1/(1 − ρ)], equal
to 2. We also assume that ζ is very low in the sector with vertically integrated production,
so the elasticity of substitution of the home and foreign intermediate input to produce the
interregional good is close to 0.W eu s ed a t ao nM e x i c o ’ sm a q u i l a d o r a st oc h o o s et h ev a l u eo f
λ. The share of imported intermediate inputs in the maquiladora’s gross output in 2001 (see
ﬁgure 4) is 75%. So, consistent with this observation, we set λ =0 .25. We also normalize
L3 =1 .
We are interested in examining changes in international business cycle synchronization
stemming from an increase in trade shares. To isolate these eﬀects, we abstract from inter-
national spillovers or contemporaneous cross-correlation of shocks to aggregate productivity.
We follow BKK and set the persistence of the shocks equal to 0.91.
As a starting point for examining the impact of trade on business cycles, we set the initial
trade shares to 0, so that the international cross-correlation of output, consumption, labor,
and investment is zero. We then select values for the parameters L1, θ1 , θ3 ,a n dω to match
the following four observations about country sizes and trade:21 (1) GDP in country 1 is
roughly 7 times as large as GDP in country 3, (2) the share of exports from country 1 to
country 2 as a share of country 1 GDP is 15%, (3) the share of value added generated by
exports of country 3 to country 1 is 15% of country 3’s GDP, and (4) all countries have a
trade balance in steady state.22 Observation (1) is consistent with the ratio of the U.S. GDP
to the combined GDP of Mexico and Canada. The 15% share of exports’ value added in
GDP is chosen so that we can compare our compare our results with other studies (BKK,
Heathcote-Perri). We recognize that this share is higher than the shares reported in Table
223 - in the experiments below we also report the results for cases with lower trade shares.
21It is well known that in a symmetric model, international trade costs generates home bias in the use
production inputs (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000)). Along this line, authors like Kose and Yi
(2003) get increases in trade shares in their model by reducing the magnitude of international trade costs.
22Note that none of these observations depends on the assumption on whether v11 is or not shipped to
country 3 to produce the good v.
23The share of exports in GDP for each country is equal to 15% when v11 and v33 are not shipped between
the core and the periphery. As reported in Table 6, export shares are much higher when all v11 and v33 are
shipped back and forth across the core and the periphery (i.e.: no value added in core when the good returns
17The resulting parameter values from this procedure are L1 =3, θ1 =0 .86 , θ2 =0 .85,a n d
ω =0 .92.
For each set of parameter values, we solve the model via a standard log-linearization
method. We then randomly draw 150 periods of the productivity shock vector At, feed them
into the model, and compute several moments of interest from the artiﬁcially generated data.
We repeat this procedure 500 times, and ﬁnally average the statistics across simulations to
produce the numbers we report in the tables.
5. Results
To gain some basic intuition for how the model works, it is useful to start with a simpler model
where trade occurs only between countries 1 and 2 in intermediate goods for x production
(see Table 5). We set the parameters θ3 =1and ω =1 , so that core countries do not use
inputs from the periphery to produce the ﬁnal good, and viceversa. The share parameter
θ1 is set so that trade between 1 and 2 accounts for 15 percent of GDP, as in BKK. The
table reports moments for countries 1 and 3.C o u n t r y3 is eﬀectively a closed economy, so
international cross correlations are zero given our joint assumptions that: (1) productivity
shocks are uncorrelated across countries, and (2) there is no spillover of productivity shocks
over time. Assuming positive cross-country correlation in the shocks would simply scale up
all the cross country correlations of the variables we are interested in.
The ﬁrst column of results shows the impact of trade on business cycles of country 1 when
the elasticity of substitution for inputs into x production is set equal to 2. Substitutability
of inputs results in a negative transmission of the cycle - as productivity increases in country
1, the relative price of intermediate inputs from country 1 falls and both countries make
more intensive use of country 1 inputs. Country 2 reduces production of x2, resulting in a
negative output correlation (−0.05) and a negative investment correlation (−0.31).24 This
is consistent with the tendency to ‘make hay where the sun shines’e m p h a s i z e db yB K K .
Consumption risksharing through complete ﬁnancial markets produces a positive, though
somewhat small, correlation in consumption (0.32). The reason that consumption is not
perfectly correlated is because the intermediate good from country 1 is used more intensively
in the creation of x1, which is consumed only by country 1 households. So, it is eﬃcient for
from the periphery). Presumably, the truth lies somewhere between these two extreme assumptions.
24Cross-correlations become more negative as we increase 1/(1 − ρ).
18country 1 to increase consumption by more than country 2.
The second column of results repeats the experiment with perfect complementarity be-
tween the inputs from goods 1 and 2. Holding the trade share constant, this shift in the
parameterization of the model yields a large change in the transmission of the business cycle.
The cross-country correlation in GDP is now 0.24 - as productivity in country 1 increases,
demand for country 2’s input also increases. Consumption in countries 1 and 2 is now neg-
atively correlated. This is because the relative price of the good produced by country 2
(and also intensively consumed by country 2) increases by so much that eﬃcient risk sharing
dictates that country 2 reduce consumption in order to allocate more resources to country
1.25 These patterns generated by the two-country model as ρ varies are also analyzed by
Heathcote and Perri (2002).
While the two-country model helps sharpen intuition, it does not provide the complete
picture of the eﬀects of trade on business cycles for two reasons. First, our goal is to develop
a model that can simultaneously produce a relatively higher output comovement between
some country pairs, and a relatively lower comovement between other country pairs. This
requires a multi-country model. Second, the two-country model exaggerates the importance
of the elasticity of substitution between inputs because countries produce and consume only
one good. When countries participate in both the x and v sectors, the overall eﬀect of
trade on output and consumption is a mixture of the eﬀects of the production-sharing (with
elasticity of substitution equal to ζ) and non-production-sharing sectors (with elasticity of
substitution equal to ρ). Indeed, one of the challenges we face is that while production sharing
helps generate positive comovements, the production sharing sector is only small fraction of
overall economic activity. To get an accurate picture of the importance of production sharing
for aggregate economic activity, we need to embed the production sharing sector in a model
that realistically describes the rest of the economy.
Table 6 shows the results for the four-country version of the model. The elasticity para-
meters are set so that the elasticity of substitution between inputs from 1 and 2 is equal to 2
and between 1 and 3 is close to zero. The ﬁrst column reports the results when there is zero
trade (and therefore zero cross-country correlations). The second column reports the results
for the benchmark economy, where ω , θ1 ,a n dθ3 are calibrated as discussed in the previous
25Under ﬁnancial autarky (discussed in more detail below), the assumption of a low elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods together with strong home bias implies an increase in the relative price of the
good produced by country 1. So, output, labor, and consumption are negatively correlated. This pathalogical
example has been studied by Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2003).
19section. In terms of business cycle transmission, the basic model successfully generates posi-
t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dG D Pb e t w e e n1a n d3a n dn e g a t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dG D Pb e t w e e n1a n d2 ,b u t
the numbers are not very large in absolute terms. For example, the cross-correlation between
G D Pi nc o u n t r i e s1a n d3i s0.02. As mentioned above, the drop in the correlation between 1
and 3 relative to the two-country case is because countries now have mixed production struc-
tures. An increase in productivity in country 1 increases demand for inputs from country 3
in the production sharing sector, causing output to move together. But inputs from country
1 are also used in country 3’s x production. Substitutability in that sector reduces use of x33
relative to x31.T h i so ﬀsets the positive correlation arising from production sharing. Further-
more, from the perspective of country 1, the fraction of GDP generated by the production
sharing sector is substantially smaller than in the two-country model. This is because good
v represents a small share of the ﬁnal good in country 1 (ω =0 .92). For countries 1 and
2, the four-country model produces bilateral results very similar to the two-country model
when the elasticity of substitution is large. Output is negatively correlated (−0.04) because
of the substitution between factor inputs over the cycle, investment and labor inputs are
negatively correlated.
Assuming a low elasticity of substitution in the production of v relative to the elasticity
of substitution between inputs in the production of x is key in generating higher output
cross-country correlations between the core and the periphery regions, relative to the two
core regions. Column 3 in Table 6 shows that assuming 1/(1 − ρ)=1 /(1 − ζ)=2lowers the
diﬀerence in output cross-correlation from 0.06 under the baseline parametrization to 0.02.
Substitutability between inputs in production of good v implies that the output correlation
between countries 1 and 3 becomes negative, as is the output correlation between the two
core countries.
A large share of value added from country 3 in the production of v, relative to the import
content in country 3’s production of the x good, increases the extent to which output is
correlated between countries 1 and 3. Column 4 in Table 6 reports a modiﬁed parametrization
of the baseline calibration, where the share of imports in country 3’s production of the x
good was reduced from 15% to 8%. Complementarity between inputs of countries 1 and 3
associated to production sharing is only partially oﬀset by substitutability in the production
of the x good. This implies that the output cross-correlation between these two countries
increases from 0.02 to 0.04. If, on top of this, we double the share of value added by
20the production sharing sector in country 3 from 15% to 30%, the output cross-correlation
between countries 1 and 3 increases to 0.12.
Finally, column 5 i nT a b l e6s t u d i e st h ec a s ew h e r ef o ra l lf o u rc o u n t r i e st h es h a r eo f
value added generated by exports in total GDP is 8%, relative to 15% in the baseline model.
As expected given the lower importance of value added associated to trade, the diﬀerence in
output cross-correlations across the two pairs of regions falls from 0.06 to 0.04.
A property of the baseline model under complete ﬁnancial markets is that consumption
is negatively correlated between countries 1 and 3. The reason this occurs is because as
productivity in country 1 rises, demand for country 3’s good rises driving up its price.
Under complete markets, households in country 3 are willing to substitute consumption
intertemporally in order to reallocate its intermediate good to country 1. Column 4 through
6 in Table 7 considers the case of ﬁnancial autarky. Qualitatively, the patterns in output,
investment and labor under ﬁnancial autarky are similar to those under complete markets.
The main diﬀerence between the two environments is that consumption in country 1 and
country 3 tend to be more highly correlated. In the case of ﬁnancial autarky, households in
country 3 experience a positive wealth eﬀect from the increase in the price of good 3, driving
up country 3’s consumption. Instead of pushing consumption in opposite directions, the
model now tends to push consumption together. This is more consistent with the pattern in
the data that cross-country correlations of output, labor, consumption, and investment tend
to move together over time.
Two extensions of the benchmark model
Column 2 in Table 7 shows the impact of assuming that value added is only 50% of
gross output (i.e.: γ =0 .5 under extension 1). This increases the wedge in output cross-
country correlations across pairs of countries by a small amount relative to the benchmark
model (0.06 to 0.08). The use of intermediate inputs acts as a multiplier on the output
eﬀect - as more local factors are used in the production sharing sector, for example, the
complementarity between inputs now has a bigger eﬀect on the aggregate economy.
Extending the model to include diﬀusion of technology through MNEs is the most success-
ful in terms of generating a wedge between output cross-country correlations across pairs of
countries. We set η =1 , which assumes that the MNE and aﬃliate fully share any technolog-
ical innovations in production. Column 3 in Table 7 reports our ﬁndings. The co-movements
b e t w e e n1a n d2a r eu n a ﬀected by this assumption, because production sharing only occurs
21between 1 and 3. By eﬀectively increasing the correlation of the shocks to the production
sharing sector, the model produces higher correlations between output in countries 1 and
3( 0.35). Consumption is more correlated between 1 and 3 as well, because country 3 no
longer has to forego as much home consumption to shift resources to country 1 in response
to a given increase in country 1 productivity. It seems clear that signiﬁcant positive busi-
ness cycle transmission from 1 to 3 depends on technological diﬀusion through production
sharing.
What does this model teach us about the connection between international business
cycles and trade? First, the direction of the transmission of the business cycle (positive vs.
negative co-movements) depends on the nature of trade (production sharing with low short
run elasticity of substitution between inputs vs. trade in varieties of intermediate goods with
relatively higher elasticity of substitution between inputs). Second, the magnitude of business
cycle transmission through production sharing depends on the share of value added in the
production sharing sector relative to total GDP in both countries, not merely the extent
of exports in GDP. This distinction is important because value added may be only a small
share of exports when these include a signiﬁcant portion of imported intermediate inputs.
Third, value added shares of trade in the data are low in many countries, so any model of
trade will require a signiﬁcant multiplier to have a measurable impact on the business cycle.
Fourth, even with large value added shares, there may be oﬀsetting eﬀects that dampen the
overall impact of trade. Thus, it may be diﬃcult to extract the importance of "trade" per
se on a country’s business cycle, because the eﬀects of trade will have diﬀerent implications
for diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Finally, the largest eﬀects of trade for business cycle
synchronization stem from technological spillovers. This may be an obvious point but what
is less obvious - and critically important for understanding the transmission of international
business cycles - is whether these spillovers occur at the ﬁrm-, industry- or national-level.
6. Conclusions
This paper develops a model to explain international business cycle dynamics and trade ﬂows
between diﬀerent types of countries. The model we study embodies features of production
sharing between core and periphery regions as well as trade in intermediate goods between
core regions. The model successfully produces diverging output correlations between core
and periphery regions, although it falls short of explaining the magnitude of the divergence
22observed in the data. In order for production sharing to matter signiﬁcantly for business
cycles, it must either draw in a signiﬁcant amount of value added from the local economy
in the core and/or periphery, or lead to signiﬁcant technological spillovers into the local
economy of the periphery.
The model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions that deserve further study.
In particular, we abstract from longer run substitutability across countries in the location of
production sharing plants. One possible direction for further study is to include ﬁxed costs
in the establishment of a production sharing arrangement. This margin will be operative
when shocks are large and persistent (i.e.: trade liberalizations, changes in taxation of foreign
corporations, etc.). Under this extension, the model has the potential of providing insights
into the issue of "footloose" MNEs shifting their production operations across countries at
low frequencies, as well as higher frequency business cycle synchronization between core and
periphery regions.
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Figure 1:  Bilateral Correlations between US and Europe
Ten-year rolling correlations of GDP, consumption, investment and employment between the United States and a European 
















































































































































Source: Quarterly National Accounts, SourceOECD





















































































































































Ten-year rolling correlations of GDP, consumption, investment and employment between the United States and Canada
Data are HP-filtered and deseasonalized. 
Source: Quarterly National Accounts, SourceOECD
Values in 2000 Dollars and HP filtered
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Figure 4: Trade by the Mexican Maquila Sector
Maquila Exports/Total exports excluding oil
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Table 1:  Co-movements for the United States and Europe with Major Trading Partners
(Quarterly data, all series HP filtered.) 
1. Correlations with the United States
a. GDP US-ROW US-Eur US-Jpn US-Can US-Mex US-Mex
a.
70.1-79.4 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.54
80.1-89.4 0.49 0.53 0.07 0.84 -0.03 -0.58
90.1-99.4 0.00 0.06 -0.25 0.74 0.19 0.37
00.1-04.2 0.76 0.54 0.71 0.53 0.61 0.51
b. Consumption US-ROW US-Eur US-Jpn US-Can US-Mex
70.1-79.4 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.48
80.1-89.4 0.27 0.12 0.22 0.53 -0.29
90.1-99.4 -0.04 -0.01 -0.23 0.60 0.11
00.1-04.2 0.73 0.77 -0.33 0.77 0.41
c. Investment US-ROW US-Eur US-Jpn US-Can US-Mex
70.1-79.4 0.78 0.79 0.70 -0.39
80.1-89.4 0.11 0.20 -0.06 0.12 0.19
90.1-99.4 -0.07 0.02 -0.26 0.51 0.00
00.1-04.2 0.88 0.75 0.80 0.83 0.78
2. Correlations with Europe 
b.
a. GDP EU-ROW EU-US EUR-JpnEUR-EastEur
c.
70.1-79.4 0.78 0.74 0.67 n.a.
80.1-89.4 0.66 0.53 0.45 n.a.
90.1-99.4 0.37 0.06 0.49 0.43
00.1-04.2 0.52 0.54 0.24 0.41
b. Consumption EU_ROW EU-US EUR-JpnEUR-EastEur
c.
70.1-79.4 0.83 0.75 0.83 n.a.
80.1-89.4 0.12 0.12 0.15 n.a.
90.1-99.4 0.08 -0.01 0.20 0.13
00.1-04.2 0.72 0.77 -0.34 -0.13
c. Investment EU_ROW EU_US EUR-JpnEUR-EastEur
c.
70.1-79.4 0.85 0.79 0.78 n.a.
80.1-89.4 0.51 0.20 0.14 n.a.
90.1-99.4 0.52 0.02 0.54 0.37
00.1-04.2 0.72 0.75 0.53 0.55
Data sources: Source OECD.  Quarterly National Accounts
Footnotes:
a. Correlation between GDP in Mexico and the United States using annual data. Historical Mexican GDP from 
Estadisticas de Contabilidad Nacional, Producto Interno Bruto Serie Historica Desde 1900. 
b. European aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.







Table 2: Bilateral trade flows 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-01 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-01
A. US imports and exports from the following countries as a share of total imports and exports
EU15 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.21
Eastern Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North America 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.37
Canada 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.23
Mexico 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.14
Asia 0.29 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.28
B. EU15 imports and exports from the following countries as a share of total imports and exports
Eastern Europe 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
North America 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.27
US 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.24
Canada 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mexico 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Asia 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.29
C. Canadian imports and exports from the following countries as a share of total imports and exports
EU15 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.05
Eastern Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North America 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.80 0.88
US 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.80 0.87
Mexico 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Asia 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.05
D. Mexican imports and exports from the following countries as a share of total imports and exports
EU15 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03
Eastern Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
North America 0.76 0.80 0.86 0.91
US 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.89
Canada 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Asia 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
E. East European imports and exports from the following countries as a share of total imports and exports
1997-99 2000-03 1997-99 2000-03
EU15 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.78
North America 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
US 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Asia 0.19 0.23 0.10 0.08
Data Sources: Source OECD, International Trade in Commodities
Footnotes:
a. European aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
b.  Eastern Europe Aggregate is composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland

















Table 3: Trade shares in GDP
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-01
b.
A. (Exports +  imports)/GDP
US 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.18
EU15
a. 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22
Japan 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.17
Canada 0.41 0.46 0.59 0.74
Mexico 0.47 0.56
Canada+ Mexico 0.54 0.68
B. (Exports +  Imports of manufactured goods)/Manufacturing GDP
US 0.32 0.51 0.79 1.06
EU15
a. 0.38 0.50 0.70 0.89
Japan 0.66 0.75 0.66 0.88
Canada 1.36 1.79 2.51 2.93
Mexico 1.87 2.57
Canada+ Mexico 2.24 2.75
C. Manufacturing Value Added/GDP
US 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14
EU15a. 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.20
Japan 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.20
Canada 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.20
Mexico 0.20 0.20 0.19
Canada+ Mexico 0.19 0.18 0.20
Data sources: Source OECD.  International Trade by Commodity Database and STAN Industrial Structural Analysis 
Footnotes:
a. European aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
b. For Canada and the EU15 GDP and manufacturing value added only available through 1999.















Table 4: Production sharing by US MNEs
1977 1982 1989 1994 1999
(Manufacturing)
A. Sales by US affiliates to the US, as a share of total sales of affiliates
Canada 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.43 0.43
Mexico 0.07 0.08 0.29 0.32 0.35
Europe 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06
J a p a n 0 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 0 90 . 0 70 . 0 3
B. US Exports from parents to affiliates/Total sales of affiliates
(Manufacturing)
Canada 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.38
Mexico 0.15 0.22 0.44 0.43 0.45
Europe 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
J a p a n 0 . 0 90 . 1 10 . 1 00 . 1 00 . 1 0
C. Importance of Production Sharing in Local Value Added in Manufacturing
(Sales of affiliates to US - Exports to affiliates*Share of US in total sales)/Mftg GDP
Canada 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.35
Mexico 0.36 0.26 0.37 0.42 0.42
Europe 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
J a p a n 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
Source:  Data on exports to and sales by US affiliates from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Manuracturing GDP from Source OECD. 
Table 5: Two-country model
omega= 1, v3= 1 omega= 1, v3= 1
SUBSTITUTES COMPLEMENTS
Steady state statistics rho= 0.5 rho= -20
GDP3 / GDP1 0.15 0.15
value added of exports1 / GDP1 0.15 0.15
value added of exports3 / GDP3 0.00 0.00
value added of exports from 1 to 2 / GDP1 0.15 0.15
exports 1 (including V11) / GDP1 0.15 0.15
exports 3 (including V11) / GDP3 0.01 0.01
Country 1 moments
stdev. C1 / stdev. GDP1 0.27 0.41
stdev. I1 / stdev. GDP1 3.66 3.52
correl (TB1 , GDP1) -0.32 -0.37
Country 3 moments
stdev. C3 / stdev. GDP3 0.32 0.32
stdev. I3 / stdev. GDP3 3.10 3.10
correl (TB3 , GDP3) -0.69 -0.49














Labor 0.10 -0.75 
Table 6: Four country model
rho =  csi   Higher share Lower trade
No trade Benchmark  = 0.5 of V13 in V shares
1234 5
Steady state statistics
GDP3 / GDP1 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14
value added of exports1 / GDP1 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.08
value added of exports3 / GDP3 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.08
value added of exports from 1 to 2 / GDP1 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07
exports 1 (including V11) / GDP1 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.11
exports 3 (including V11) / GDP3 0.01 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.32
Country 1 moments
stdev. C1 / stdev. GDP1 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29
stdev. I1 / stdev. GDP1 3.10 3.62 3.63 3.60 3.33
correl (TB1 , GDP1) -0.01 -0.35 -0.33 -0.32 -0.26
Country 3 moments
stdev. C3 / stdev. GDP3 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.34 0.31
stdev. I3 / stdev. GDP3 3.10 3.50 3.57 3.26 3.29
correl (TB3 , GDP3) -0.69 -0.48 -0.25 -0.44 -0.48
International cross correlations, country 1 country 2
GDP 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
Consumption 0.00 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.19
Investment 0.00 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.14
Labor 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07
International cross correlations, country 1 country 3
GDP 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01
Consumption 0.00 0.07 0.19 -0.06 0.05
Investment 0.00 -0.13 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06
Labor 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.03
Difference in cross correl. corr(X1,corrX3) - corr(X1,X2)
GDP 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04
Consumption 0.00 -0.22 -0.09 -0.35 -0.15
Investment 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.08
Labor 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.21 0.10
Complete Markets 
Table 7: Extensions to the Four Country model
Intermediate Intermediate
Benchmark Goods Diffusion Benchmark Goods Diffusion
123 45 6
Steady state statistics 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13
GDP3 / GDP1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
value added of exports1 / GDP1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
value added of exports3 / GDP3 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
value added of exports from 1 to 2 / GDP1 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.27
exports 1 (including V11) / GDP1 0.60 0.60 1.07 0.60 0.60 1.07
exports 3 (including V11) / GDP3
Country 1 moments 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.31
stdev. C1 / stdev. GDP1 3.62 4.16 3.67 2.92 2.95 2.99
stdev. I1 / stdev. GDP1 -0.35 -0.44 -0.33 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
correl (TB1 , GDP1)
Country 3 moments 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.37
stdev. C3 / stdev. GDP3 3.50 4.02 4.05 2.76 2.85 3.65
stdev. I3 / stdev. GDP3 -0.48 -0.47 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
correl (TB3 , GDP3)
International cross correlations, country 1 country 2 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.15 0.04
GDP 0.29 0.36 0.27 0.15 0.27 0.15
Consumption -0.27 -0.39 -0.29 0.13 0.24 0.13
Investment -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 0.13 0.24 0.13
Labor
International cross correlations, country 1 country 3 0.02 0.09 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.32
GDP 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.26 0.44 0.10
Consumption -0.13 -0.20 -0.11 0.23 0.40 0.07
Investment 0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.23 0.39 0.07
Labor
Difference in cross correl. corr(X1,corrX3) - corr(X1,X2) 0.06 0.08 0.35 0.03 0.09 0.28
GDP -0.22 -0.25 -0.16 0.11 0.17 -0.04
Consumption 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.16 -0.06
Investment 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.16 -0.06
Labor
Complete Markets Financial Autarky